Research

Draft Paper

Abstract: Low-income students are less likely to attend elite universities than equally qualified high-income peers, in large part because they apply at lower rates. We study whether this reflects lack of exposure to students who have attended top universities, and how exposure affects students’ perceptions. Using UK administrative data, we exploit “breakthrough” events when a school first sends a student to a top university. Applications from that school to that university subsequently rise by 30%. This access promotes upward mobility: marginal entrants graduate at typical rates and earn £4,000 more annually than matched control students, despite coming from relatively poor backgrounds. To understand why students who lack exposure might not apply, we turn to a field experiment in British schools. We find that a primary barrier is students' beliefs about their social fit. At baseline, low-income students are more pessimistic about their social fit at elite universities, but not their chances of receiving an offer or graduating. Students randomly assigned to view short videos of undergraduates discussing their experiences are 6 percentage points more likely to apply to the speaker's university. This treatment makes students more positive about their social fit at that university, with no effect on other beliefs. Finally, when matched with mentors, students primarily seek out information about social life. Our findings highlight perceptions of the social environment at elite universities as a central barrier to applications and illustrate scalable treatments to promote access and social mobility.

Draft Paper

Abstract: Do high-stakes standardized tests expand or inhibit opportunity for low-SES students? We answer this question in the context of the UK's staggered elimination of pre-university exams in favor of teachers' predicted exam grades. Eliminating testing increases the university enrollment of low-income students by 3 percentage points (7%), while leaving wealthy students' enrollment unchanged. Marginal students induced to enroll in university attain employment at better firms and, in expectation, earn £50,000–£100,000 more over their careers, in net present value. Paradoxically, standardized exams exhibit no calibration bias against marginal low-income students—accurately predicting their university success—whereas teacher-supplied grades are systematically biased in their favor. Despite proper calibration, standardized tests inhibit low-SES students by deterring human capital investment. When tests are eliminated, 5% of low-income students shift into academic tracks. These findings highlight how disparate impacts can arise even when screening algorithms are unbiased. When the measurement of information itself poses a direct disutility, standardized tests generate disparities that commence earlier in the pipeline.

Draft paper

Abstract: Do individual CEOs systematically affect firm markups? We estimate a two-way fixed effects model of markups on CEO and firm dummies, with corrections for limited mobility bias, and find that CEO effects account for 10-14% of markup variance. Event studies around CEO transitions suggest that high-markup CEOs reduce variable costs while holding revenue and employment steady; low-markup CEOs preside over broad contraction. A triple-difference design exploiting exogenous departures due to deaths and retirements yields a similar pattern. We investigate the cost discipline channel through two independent sources. First, we score 79,490 earnings call transcripts with a Large Language Model along three dimensions: operational efficiency, cost-cutting, and pricing power. Highmarkup CEOs' cost language skews toward efficiency rather than active restructuring; pricing language is indistinguishable across CEO types. Second, product-level quantity data from India, where output prices and marginal costs can be directly observed, allow us to decompose the CEO markup effect into price and cost components: the entire effect is accounted for by lower marginal costs (β =-0.186, t = 3.57), with no effect on prices (β =-0.047, t = 0.91). In India, CEO effects are nearly twice as large among professionally managed firms (14.6%) as among family-promoter firms (8.3%), suggesting that market-based selection amplifies the dispersion in executive quality. 

Extending admission offers with incomplete information on students' ability can lead to negative consequences for universities in two ways: moral hazard, where students reduce academic effort in response to an early offer, and adverse selection, where students with low private signals self-select into early offers before the public signal is realized. We disentangle these mechanisms in the context of the UK's university admission system using the staggered roll-out of unconditional offers. Takers of these offers scored 0.14SD lower on age-18 exams than decliners conditional on observables, but this decrease in performance is driven entirely by adverse selection. We rule out a moral hazard share of up to one-third, indicating a high degree of private information. Using a structural model of admissions, we estimate that students privately know about two-thirds of the residual variance in their realized test scores. We use these estimates to quantify the distributional effects of unconditional offers and alternative systems, finding that welfare gains are concentrated among lower-achieving students, that continuing to allow unconditional offers at moderate, pre-ban intensities is close to welfare-neutral for the market as a whole, and that welfare is highest under a counterfactual system that delays admissions decisions until after final exam results are known. Although participating universities were worse off because enrolling cohorts had lower realized test scores, students benefited from a higher probability of university enrollment at age 18 and 2.4% higher earnings by age 26. Our findings highlight how incentives students face and their information structure have key impacts on the design of admissions systems.

The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is a key parameter in models in macroeconomics and public finance, but credible estimates of this parameter require exogenous variation in the intertemporal price of consumption. We use variation in the formula by which employers match their employees’ retirement savings contributions in the United States to credibly estimate this parameter jointly with inertia in savings contributions. We link administrative data on earnings and retirement plan contributions for the US population with data on the retirement savings policies at over 100,000 firms. We make use of bunching at kink points in the budget set induced by employer matching, employee responses to moves across firms, employee responses to within-firm plan changes, and responses to automatic enrollment policies to separately identify inertia, risk aversion, and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We develop a life-cycle model to exploit these different sources of quasi-experimental variation to estimate the level and heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution across the population.

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